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THE NEW TORT OF BAD FAITH BREACH OF
CONTRACT: CHRISTIAN v. AMERICAN
HOME ASSURANCE CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a growing number of jurisdictions today, courts are recognizing
a new cause of action affording greater protection to the economic in-
terests and mental security of parties to special contractual relation-
ships.' This movement has developed in the context of insurance
industry litigation. The cause of action is in tort with a corresponding
effect in the law of contracts.' These developments establish the princi-
ple that, in contractual relationships, "bad faith conduct" that precipi-
tates or exacerbates a breach of contract, may be regarded as tortious.
3
Not only do the holdings of these jurisdictions have substantial conse-
quences for the insurance industry,4 but they may also come to affect
1. Numerous cases embrace the new concept of tortious breach of contract. See, e.g., Eck-
enrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Ill. law); Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Alper-Salvage Co., 19 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1927) (applying Tenn. law); Escambia Treating
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976); United States Auto Ass'n v.
Wenley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Campbell v. Government Employers Ins. Co., 306 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1974);
Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Serv. Corp., 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974); Kirk v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970); Cf Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
2. See Communale.v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,-, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958);
See also Christian v. American Home Assur. Corp., 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 1714, 1717 (July 12, 1977), as
amended, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 439 (March 10, 1978). See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1972). See notes 67-80 infra and accompanying text.
4. The impact on the insurance industry is significant: Aggrieved plaintiffs have recovered
attorney fees, litigation costs, mental suffering, and punitive damages. See, e.g., Richardson v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App.3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) (The appellate court,
noting that the insurer's actions constituted a tortious breach of contract for which punitive dam-
ages could be assessed rather than the intentional infliction of emotional distress, remanded for
retrial on the issue of damages.); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 95 Cal. Rptr.
678 (1971) ($200,000 punitive damages and $1,050 actual damages); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (verdict of $60,000 compensatory and
$650,000 punitive damages); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.Rptr.
13 (1967) (liability of $91,000 in excess of policy limits); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
1
Myers: The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. Americ
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
TULSA LAW JO UNAL
contracting parties in other forms of business transactions as well.'
As is often the case with new developments in the law, it was a
progressive court in a particular state, here California, which cultivated
the theory that an insurer may be liable to its insured for non-
contractual damages under appropriate circumstances. Although this
concept was once limited in application to California,6 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp.,7 re-
cently joined other jurisdictions8 which now recognize this new tort.
However, while the California courts are credited for its establishment,
they have not articulated the precise breach that will give rise to liabil-
ity. This lack of precision has left confusion among the courts and im-
peded attempts to fully define the elements of this new tort.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Christian, combined selected
portions from the developmental California cases in this area. In so
doing, Christian implicitly encompassed the fundamental principles of
this new tort concept. This comment will analyze the law and attempt
to name and define the requisite elements for the new cause of action
hereinafter referred to as the tort of "Bad Faith Breach."9
The Oklahoma Decision
Bobby Christian, the plaintiff-insured in the Oklahoma case, ob-
tained a disability insurance policy from the defendant-insurer, Ameri-
can Home Assurance Corporation, through his employment with the
Dow Chemical Company. The premium payments were deducted from
the insured's wages and fully paid, when in the scope of his employ-
ment, Christian received injuries leaving him totally and permanently
disabled. He timely filed proper proof of disability and made demand
for the maximum face amount of the policy, $50,000. The insurer did
not pay, nor state the reason for withholding payment of the claim.
Christian thereafter brought an action in state court alleging the insurer
50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (liability in excess of policy limits). Seenotes 105-114 infa and
accompanying text.
5. See notes 115-120 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text. However, a number of jurisdictions have
declined to follow the California approach, see Scottish Union v. National Ins. Co., 201 F.2d 163
(6th Cir. 1953); Baxter v. Royal Indemn. Co., 285 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1973); Drake v. Milwaukee Mut.
Ins. Co., 70 Wisc.2d 977, 236 N.W.2d 204 (1975); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M.
757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974); Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972);
Evans v. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 367 S.W.2d 85 (rex.Ct. App. 1963).
7. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 1714 (July 12, 1977), as amended, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 439 (March 10,
1978). See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
8. See note 1, su.pra.
9. See notes 121-130 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:606
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had breached the contract and sought recovery of the maximum policy
benefits. Home Assurance ultimately paid the judgment rendered in
favor of plaintiff for the maximum disability benefits. During the trial,
it became apparent that the insurer "did not have, and had never had,
any defense to the insured's claim."'"
The insured then filed a separate action asserting tort liability for
the insured's "bad faith refusal to pay his valid claim."'" The insured
alleged that the insurer's acts were intentional, committed with "malice
and oppression"' 2 in total disregard of their duty to pay plaintiff's legit-
imate claim, and that the insurer, in so doing, breached the duty to
treat him fairly and act in good faith."' The insured sought to recover
attorney's fees and litigation costs expended in the original action,
along with compensatory and punitive damages, including damages for
alleged mental suffering and distress. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
concluded that plaintiff Christian had stated a cause of action and spe-
cifically stated that "this is a distinct tort based upon an implied duty of
the insurer to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured."' 4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court had previously held that insurers
have a duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with their insured and
that breach of this duty may result in the insurer's liability for amounts
in excess of the policy limits.'" American Home Assurance, however,
argued that this prior holding was limited to insurance contracts which
created "agency" relationships where the insurer represents the insured
in the settlement of third party claims.' 6 Further, the defendant relied
upon an Oklahoma statute' 7 that limits recovery for damages caused
by a breach of contract to the amount due with interest only.
In rejecting this second argument, the state supreme court disap-
proved two prior federal district court decisions construing Oklahoma
10. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1714.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1718.
13. Id at 1717-1718.
14. Id. at 1714-1715.
15. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. L. C. Jones Trucking Co., 321 P.2d 685 (Okla. 1958);
National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948).
16. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1716.
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §22 (1971) provides, "The detriment caused by the breach of an
obligation to pay money only is deemed to be the amount due by the terms of the obligation, with
interest thereon." Cf OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §9 (1971) which provides,
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arisingfrom contract, where the defend-
ant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addi-
tion to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of
punishing the defendant. (Emphasis added).
1978]
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law 8 which limited recovery on an insurance contract to the face value
of the policy. Thereby, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted the
California principle that an insurance company has an implied duty to
deal fairly and act in good faith, and that a violation of this duty gives
rise to an action in tort where, in the proper case, punitive damages
may be sought.' 9
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA
The premier case in California, Comunale v. Traders & General
Insurance Co.,2 considered the rights of the insured against their in-
surer for the insurer's bad faith conduct. The California Supreme
Court held that a covenant of good faith dealing is implied in every
contract and, for the first time, expressly applied that principle to insur-
ance policies.2' In relation to insurance contracts, the covenant pro-
vides that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of
the other to receive the benefits of the agreement, and that the insurer
will take into account the interests of the insured, giving them at least
as much consideration as their own interest.22 In Comunale, this cove-
nant was held to require the insurer to settle a claim against the insured
when that was the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim,
even if the express terms of the policy did not impose such a duty.23 An
insurer who violates this covenant does so at its own risk, allowing the
insured to be compensated for all detriment that results, including
amounts in excess of the policy limits. Though historically treated as a
tort cause of action, the wrongful refusal to settle was determined to
sound both in contract and tort, thus affording an election in the rem-
edy to be pursued.24
California, almost ten years later, reaffirmed this concept in Crisc
v. Security Insurance Co.25 Here, the court appeared to be saying that
18. See Ledford v. Travelers Indem. Co., 318 F.Supp. 1333 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Renfroe v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 296 F.Supp. 1137 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
19. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1716-17.
20. 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (Plaintiffs were struck by a truck driven by the in-
sured. Insured's policy with Traders contained liability limits of $10,000 for each person injured
and $20,000 for each action. Traders refused to defend or settle when an offer to accept $4,000 was
made by the plaintiffs. Traders was obligated to defend any personal injury suit covered by the
policy limits. The trial resulted in judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The California Supreme
Court ruled that the insurer could be found liable for an amount in excess of the policy limits.
Judgment rendered in favor of the Comunales for $11,250).
21. Id at-, 328 P.2d at 200.
22. Id at-, 328 P.2d at 201.
23. Id
24. Id at -, 328 P.2d at 203.
25. 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). (Plaintiff was a tenant in an apart-
[Vol. 13:606
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"peace of mind" was a contracted property right. Bad faith conduct by
the insurer infringed this property right causing a breach of the insur-
ance contract.26 Invasion of one's peace of mind is clearly tortious in
nature despite the fact that such behavior also involves a breach of con-
tract. The damages recoverable were expanded by permitting relief for
the insured's mental suffering caused by the insurer's bad faith conduct
in refusing to negotiate a proposed settlement of a third party claim. In
other words, the court restricted recovery for mental suffering for
breach of contract to those cases where there is also tortious conduct in
the nature of a substantial invasion of clearly protected property inter-
ests.27
Confusion as to whether the insured's recovery was in contract,
tort, or both, stunted the development of the cause of action after
Crisci. Soon thereafter, Fletcher v. Western Lfe Insurance Co.28 fol-
lowed, premised on the established tort theory of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, deemed applicable due to the extreme and outra-
geous conduct by the insurance company.2 9 However, the court took
the initiative to add an alternative theory for the breach of the implied
covenant of fair dealing. It suggested that the breach of the covenant
ment building owned by defendant. Plaintiff was descending the apartment's outside wooden
staircase when a tread gave way. She fell through the resulting opening up to her waist and was
left hanging 15 feet above the ground suffering physical injuries and developing a very severe
psychosis. She sought $400,000 to compensate for injuries and medical expenses. The defendant
had $10,000 insurance coverage issued by Security Ins. Co. Plaintiffs attorney reduced her settle-
ment demand to $10,000 but Security was only willing to pay $3,000. After a jury verdict of
$101,000 Mrs. Crisci, an immigrant widow of 70, lost her apartment building, became indigent,
dependent on her grandchildren and attempted suicide several times. Security was held liable for
its failure to settle and for its insured's resulting mental anguish).
26. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
27. Id. at - 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
28. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (The insured had a fourth grade education,
was a common laborer, age 41, married 20 years with eight children. He earned approximately
$289 per week working 70 to 80 hours. He purchased a disability policy from Western National
that paid $150 per month for two years for disability due to sickness, or a maximum of 30 years if
due to injury. The plaintiff sustained a back injury in the course of employment and was unable to
work again. Doctors who examined him were virtually in unanimous agreement that he was dis-
abled. The insurance company undertook a concerted course of action to persuade its insured to
surrender his policy or settle on unfavorable terms. When this appeared to fail, the insurance
company accused him of a misrepresentation in his insurance application for failure to disclose a
congenital back ailment they alleged was the cause of the insured's pain. The company terminated
further disability payments and demanded return of those paid. The insured testified that he and
his family were required to eat macaroni, beans and potatoes; that his utilities were turned off, that
he was required to "gather" money from friends and neighbors to have them turned back on; that
his house payments were delinquent; that his wife had to leave home and work, and as a result he
had to take one of his children out of school to tend to him and one small child. The court ruled
that due to the resulting mental suffering, the action sounded both in tort and contract and puni-
tive damages were allowed).
29. Id. at -, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
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gave rise to a separate action in tort, describing the insurer's bad faith
conduct with the words, "tortious interference with a protected prop-
erty interest. 3
°
This new tort had a thorough review in the landmark case of
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.3 There, the insurer's duty of good
,faith was deemed absolute, unconditional, and independent of the per-
formance of the insured's contractual obligations 2.3  The California Su-
preme Court stepped forward and adopted the alternative rationale in
Fletcher, firmly establishing the new tort. Reviewing the historical de-
velopment of bad faith breach, California has established that an insur-
ance company is under a contractual duty to the insured to act in good
faith and deal fairly with him. A cause of action will be recognized for
the protection of property interests and the recovery of economic losses
which flow from an aggravated breach of that duty.
III. OKLAHOMA ADDS NEW DIMENSIONS
Subtle Conduct
The discussion by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Christian pre-
sents two important distinctions from the California cases. In the Cali-
fornia cases, the bad faith conduct of the insurance companies was
either more apparent and outrageous 33 or the resulting consequence to
the insured was more extreme.34 In the Oklahoma case, the insurer's
bad faith conduct was substantially more subtle, the wrongful conduct
being in the nature of a deviation from standard ethical business prac-
tices; a simple refusal to settle promptly.35
30. Id at -, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
31. 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973) (The insured was a night club
owner who had his property covered by three separate fire insurance policies. Following a fire the
insured was charged with both arson and defrauding his insurance company. He contended that a
law enforcement officer received this allegation from one of his insurance companies, who claimed
he had excess insurance on the subject property. While the criminal charge of arson was pending
the insurer demanded the insured's appearance to examine him concerning the fire. The insured's
attorney advised him not to make the appearance until the arson charge was resolved, and the
attorney notified the insurance company that the insured would appear subsequent to outcome of
the criminal charge. The company accepted this as a breach of the policy and refused to perform
its obligation. After the arson charge was dropped, the insured, unable to obtain cooperation from
the insurance company, successfully brought action against Aetna for emotional distress, loss of
earnings and other consequential damages).
32. Id. at -, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
33. See, e.g., Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1972); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
34. See notes 25-30 supra.
35. Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 1714 (July 12, 1977) was with-
drawn from publication by the court five months after it was decided, see 567 P.2d XXIV (Table
6
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In the second action, the one based on the bad faith breach, the
defendant demurred on the ground that the prior judgment, for pay-
ment of the policy, had been satisfied and released. Thus, reasoned the
insurance company, the plaintiff could not have any other claim against
them for damages, including attorney fees and litigation costs. How-
ever, the problem with the insurer's argument is that it would never be
in the best financial interests of the insurance company to pay a claim
if, as a prerequisite to payment, the insured at his own expense, was
first required to initiate suit. Certainly, not every insured could afford
the time, effort, and expense to litigate the matter. This procedure
would obviously favor the interests of the insurance company, espe-
cially in instances such as Christian where the defendant had deter-
mined beforehand to avoid payment of the claim.
3 6
The California standard as stated in Crisci is that "an insurer must
give the interests of the insured at least as much consideration as it
gives its own interests. ' 37 The Oklahoma court may be going further
and saying that the insurer, in considering payment of the claim,
should give the insured's interest more weight than its own. Both states'
courts reflect the idea than an insured purchases insurance and not an
unjustified court battle when he enters into the insurance contract. 8
A Statutory Duty
In 1958, the California Supreme Court in Communale stated that
"[t]here is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right
of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. '39 This is an im-
plied contractual duty that neither party will act in bad faith. The same
court in Crisci further expounded "that the implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate
of Cases Reported). The original text was partially amended. The amendments did not affect the
holding of the court but only clarified what the court did not hold: "We do not hold that an
insurer who resists and litigates a claim made by its insured does so at its peril. . . .Resort to a
jurdicial [sic] forum is not per se bad faith or unfair dealing .
36. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1714.
37. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
See also Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 191 F.Supp. 538, 540 (1961), where the court
reiterated, "Thus, the law imposes upon the insurer the obligation of good faith-basically, the
duty to consider, in good faith, the insured's interests as well as its own when making decisions as
to settlement."
38. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(1970), concluded, "Among the considerations in purchasing insurance, as insurers are well aware,
is the peace of mind and security it will provide in the event of accidental loss." (Citing Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 180, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19(1967)).
39. 50 Cal.2d at -, 328 P.2d at 200. (emphasis added).
1978]
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case although the express terms of the policy do not impose the duty."40
In 1970, the California Court of Appeals, in Fletcher, said, "[A]n in-
surer owes to its insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing."4 Finally, in 1973, the California Supreme Court relied on
Communale and Fletcher, in noting,
The duty violated-that of dealing fairly and in good
faith with the other party to a contract of insurance-is a duty
imposed by law, not one arising from the terms of the contract
itself. In other words, this duty of dealing fairly and in good
faith is nonconsensual in origin rather than consensual.12
In quoting this language, the Oklahoma Supreme Court approved
the implied-in-law basis of duty.43 However, the court additionally
quoted a provision of the Oklahoma Insurance Code" found to have
been violated by the insurance company: "This statutory duty imposed
upon insurance companies to pay claims immediately, recognizes that a
substantial part of the right purchased by an insured is the right to
receive the policy benefits promptly." 45 Accordingly, in the Oklahoma
opinion, the insurer was found to be in direct violation of a legitimately
imposed duty. Thus, in an insurance contract, a unique situation exists;
bad faith conduct may be viewed as a breach of the contract's terms, or
in violation of a duty imposed judicially, or legislatively, or both.46
The question logically arises, in the absence of the statutory duty,
would an insurance company in the State of Oklahoma be liable in tort
for bad faith conduct toward its insured? Based on the opinion of the
Oklahoma court, the answer is affirmative.47 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the insurance company violated the "implied in law
duty" in tort, as well as statutory duty. Although the Oklahoma court
40. 66 Cal.2d at -, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
41. 10 Cal. App. 3d at -, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
42. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, -, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480,
485 (1973).
43. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1717.
44. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §4405 A8 (1970) mandates that, in regard to accident and health
insurance contracts, policies must contain a provision as follows:
TIME OF PAYMENT OF CLAIMS: Indemnities payable under this policy for any
loss other than loss for which this policy provides any periodic payment will be paid
immediately upon receipt of due written proof of such loss. Subject to due written proof
of loss, all accrued indemnities for loss for which this policy provides periodic payment
will be paid - (insert period for payment which must not be less frequently than
monthly) and any balance remaining unpaid upon the termination of liability will be
paid immediately upon receipt of due written proof.
45. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1716 (emphasis added).
46. Cf. Larson v. District Court, 149 Mont. 131, -, 423 P.2d 598, 600 (1967) (recovery al-
lowed in contract, tort, and under statute).
47. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
8
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adopted the California approach in its holding, its opinion clearly al-
lows the insurer's conduct to be construed as a violation of a statutory
duty as well. This duty may be indicative of the strong state interest
involved in the insurer-insured relationship.
IV. ELEMENTS OF BAD FAITH BREACH
Discerning the requisite elements of this new tort is difficult. Nev-
ertheless, an examination of the California cases and the recent
Oklahoma decision, suggests that to successfully maintain an action for
bad faith breach, the plaintiff will need to allege and prove four essen-
tial elements: (1) Duty; the existence of a special relationship between
an insured and his insurer which gives rise to the responsibility of the
insurer to deal in good faith with the insured. (2) Breach of that duty;
the invasion of the insured's protected property interest in the contract
and in his peace of mind. (3) Bad faith or unreasonable conduct by the
insured. (4) Damages proximately caused by the conduct. Each of these
elements is discussed in detail below.
Special Relationsho
To date, the concept of bad faith breach has only extended to in-
surance contracts.48 The rationale for this special protection is the exist-
ence of the relationship between the insurance industry and the state
(by virtue of the government's extensive regulation thereof), and the
relationship between the insurer and its insured.
Research into the evolution of the insurance industry reveals that
the government took an early interest in regulating this enterprise be-
cause of the public's interest in seeing that the industry treated citizens
fairly. As early as 1914, the United States Supreme Court, recognized
the "monopolistic character" 50 of insurance companies noting the une-
qual bargaining power of the parties.5 The Court stated that since the
business of insurance is so "clothed with a public interest"5 2 it is rightly
subject to stringent governmental regulations. 53 Through the police
48. For a discussion of possible expansion of the tort to other business relationships, see
notes 115-120 infra and accompanying text.
49. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
50. Id. at 416.
51. Regarding the power of insurance companies, the Court noted that "the applicant for
insurance is powerless to oppose [company policy]. . . and that, it is illusory to speak of a liberty
of contract." Id at 416-417.
52. Id. at 415.
53. Id Accord, O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); W.
VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE §13 (2d ed. 1930) [hereinafter cited as VANCE].
1978]
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power, the state can regulate the insurance industry and the method in
which that business is conducted. 54 One writer explains that "[t]he busi-"
ness of insurance is ordinarily deemed to be quasi-public in nature,
impressed with a public use, so that its regulation, supervision, and
control are authorized and required to protect the general public in
safeguarding the interests of all concerned.""5 The insurer's duty to the
insured is not limited to that which arises in the normal commercial
contract; it is a form of trust where large sums of money are deposited
with the right to demand and receive services when the agreed contin-
gency occurs.5 6 Insurance companies possess great power and are there-
fore charged with great responsibility.5 7
The Christian decision quoted from Fletcher to emphasize this
aspect of the special relationship:
The insurance business is governmentally regulated to a sub-
stantial degree and is affected with a public interest, offering
services of a quasi-public nature: "To some extent this special
relationsh#7 and these special duties take cognizance of the
great disparity in the economic situations and bargaining abil-
ities of the insurer and insured."58
The quasi-public nature of this governmentally regulated business
constitutes the first part of the special relationship. It is the state, as a
party to the contract, which imposes the duty of good faith dealing. The
duty of good faith and fair dealing "attaches over and above the terms
of the contract"59 which are supplied by the insurer.
The second aspect of this element is the insured's reliance on the
insurer's credibility. "Probably no other business affects the public so
intimately as does the insurance business."6 ° Among the considerations
in purchasing insurance is the peace of mind and security that it will
provide in the event of loss, physical injury, sickness or death.61 Thus,
when an insured faces one of these difficulties, a reasonable insurance
54. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, (1914).
55. 19 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTicEs, §10321 at 2 (1946) [hereinafter cited
as APPLEMAN].
56. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 405 (1914).
57. Id at 414.
58. Christian v. American Home Assurance, 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 1714, 1715 (July 12, 1977)
(emphasis added) (quoting from Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, -,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970)).
59. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, -, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480,
488 (1973).
60. See VANCE, supra note 53, at § 13.
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cQmpany can reliably assume that the insured is plagued by worry
about himself or his family and is susceptible to emotional- distress. In
some contexts, this opportunity for over-reaching may create a fiduci-
ary relationship between the contracting parties.62
The fiduciary concept has been recognized in limited aspects of the
insurer-insured relationship. Pennsylvania courts have recognized that
in agreeing to policy terms that provide the right to handle all aspects
of claims against the insured, including the right to make a binding
settlement, the insurer assumes a fiduciary position towards the in-
sured, with the concomitant obligations to act in good faith and with
due care in representing his interests.63 If the insurer is derelict in this
duty, as when it negligently investigates the claims or unreasonably re-
fuses an offer of settlement, it may be liable in an amount beyond the
policy limits. Similarly, employing an agency theory, the Tenth Circuit
has found a fiduciary relationship between the insurer and insured aris-
ing from the terms of a policy where the insurer assumes the exclusive
power to determine whether an offer of settlement of a claim sbould be
accepted or rejected.64
The California Supreme Court in Gruenberg did not expressly de-
fine the insurer-insured relationship as fiduciary. However, they rea-
soned that the duty of the insurer not to unreasonably withhold
payments due under a policy was an extension of the existing duty im-
posed on the insurer to act in good faith and accept reasonable settle-
ments when suit is brought by a third party claiming against the
insured. The court concluded that these are merely two different as-
pects of the same duty.65 The California and Oklahoma courts have
expressed dissatisfaction with the present relationship between the in-
sured and insurer, especially considering the high emotional and eco-
nomic reliance of the insured. This special relationship arises from the
court's recognition that the insured does not contract to obtain a com-
mercial advantage, but rather for financial protection and mental se-
62. Historically, this was especially true as to marine insurance. See generally VANCE, supra
note 53, at § 74.
63. See, e.g., Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 188 A.2d 320, 322 (1963);
Contra, Stockett v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 82 R.I. 172, 106 A.2d 741 (1954) (stating that some-
thing more than the existence of the insurer-insured relationship is required before a fiduciary
relationship results).
64. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1949);
see Hazelrigg v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 241 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1957); American Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1950); see also Bollinger v. Nuss, 202
Kan. 326, 449 P.2d 502 (1969); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (Pa.
1966).
65. 9 Cal.3d at -, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
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curity against accidental loss. 66 The first element of the tort of bad faith
breach is the existence of this two prong special relationship between
the parties to an insurance contract.
Invasion of a Protected Property Interest
The second requisite element of bad faith breach is the invasion of
a protected property interest. In the context of a bad faith breach, one
part of this protected interest is economic, the contractual aspect, and
the other is the peace of mind that insurance is designed to promote,
the tort aspect. This interest can be created, protected, and defined by
terms of the contract, implied by the requirement of fair dealing,
and/or expressed by the state in statutory enactments. The fundamen-
tal difference between the tort and contract aspects lies in the nature of
the interest protected. Tort actions protect the interest of the individual
in being free from various types of harm, whereas contract actions pro-
tect the interest in having promises performed. 7 In the context of the
tort of bad faith breach, both interests are protected.
Contract Liability
In contract law, the protected interests are those expressed or im-
plied by the terms of the contract. The protection is the contract created
by the parties manifesting mutual assent to the terms; 68 the protection
being owed only to the specific individuals named.69 The property is
expressed in monetary form as the economic payment that is due the
insured upon the occurrence of the agreed contingency. The contract is
created to protect the interest in having promises performed.70 If one
party breaches, damages will be limited to the amount specified in the
contract. The rationale for this limitation was enumerated in the vener-
able case of Hadley v. Baxendale;7' recoverable damages are limited to
those reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting. The general rule followed by the courts for contract recov-
ery in insurance cases is that the property interest is the value of the
66. Compare Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d 376, -, 89 Cal, Rptr.
78, 95 (1970) with Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 1714, 1715 (July 12,
1977).
67. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
68. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §9 (1952).
69. See PROSSER supra note 67, at 613.
70. Id.
71. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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insurance policy at the time of breach.72 The apparent logic of the
courts being that the property interest is protected by the terms of the
contract and therefore was limited to the face value of the contract it-
self.
Tort Liability
The insured has a right to be dealt with fairly which is protected
by the state. One commentator notes that insurance statutes are enacted
to protect the insuring public as well as to regulate the insurance busi-
ness.73 In Christian, the protected interest was defined by a statute
74
that imposed on insurance companies the obligation to pay claims im-
mediately. This recognized that a substantial right purchased by an in-
sured is to receive the policy benefits promptly. The Court recognized
that unwarranted delay creates the precise economic hardship the in-
sured sought to avoid by purchasing the policy.75
In Fletcher, the insurer was held liable in tort for refusal to in-
demnnify their insured under a disability policy. Although the action
was brought under the tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the court explained that the insurer's conduct might also be
viewed as a violation of the insured's protected "personal interest in
emotional tranquility. ... . Similarly, Crisci reasoned that tort lia-
bility should exist where the insurer's conduct is an interference with a
legally protected interest.77 The property interest is the insured's peace
of mind and security which was bargained for in obtaining the con-
tract.78
The holding in Fletcher also supports this idea: "Among the con-
siderations in purchasing. . . insurance, as insurers are well aware, is
the peace of mind and security it will provide . . . The very risks
insured against presuppose that if and when a claim is made, the in-
sured will be disabled and in strait financial circumstances . . .,7
72. See, e.g., American Ins. Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398 (1926). See also,
20 APPLEMAN, supra note 55, at §11255.
73. 19 APPL-MAN, supra note 55 §10343, at 14.
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §4405 As (1971).
75. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1714.
76. 10 Cal. App. 3d at -, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94. While there will continue to be certain factual
situations which best lend themselves to the independent tort causes of action for fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the new tort theory of bad faith breach
could surpass, in popularity and utility, the three theories of recovery. Bad faith breach is easier to
prove, has increasing precedent, and possibly could have greater jury appeal.
77. 66 Cal.2d at -, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
78. Id.
79. 10 Cal. App. 3d at -, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
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Tort liability serves to protect these interests. The Oklahoma and Cali-
fornia cases held that "the violation of [this] duty sounds in tort
notwithstanding that it may also constitute a breach of contract. ' 0 The
second element of bad faith breach is the invasion of the property inter-
est sought to be protected.
Bad Faith Conduct
The third element of the tort of bad faith breach is the bad faith
conduct that exacerbates the breach. Such conduct is a wrongful act or
omission that adversely affects the plaintiff's protected interests. It is a
flexible standard that provides a remedy for a wrong after a careful
review of all the facts and circumstances. No attempt will be made to
define bad faith conduct, but the following discussion should be useful
in setting the parameters for this element.
There is no uniformity in the decisions as to what constitutes bad
faith. In its simplest form, bad faith is the absence of good faith. From
Communale to Gruenberg, the California courts have repeated that
there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract, including insurance policies, that neither party will do any-
thing which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of
the agreement.8" This duty extends to all aspects of company control
over decisions concerning payment, settlement, or the defense of
claims. The insurance company obviously has a self interest in making
its decision and is faced with the reconciliation of inevitably conflicting
interests.82 Because the company is in a position of power to adversely
affect the insured's interest, it must necessarily bear a legal responsibil-
ity for the "proper exercise of that power."8 3
Bad faith, or the failure to comply with the duty of good faith, is
generally proven by evidence which is largely circumstantial. 84 Plain-
tifi's burden of proof is merely to show bad faith by a preponderance of
the evidence.8 5 In Christian, the Oklahoma court said that the obliga-
tion of an insurer to its insured, upon presentation of a valid claim, is
not limited to the payment of money only. The court held that the
80. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93
(1970); see also Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 1714, 1715 (July 12,
1977).
81. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, -, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, -,510 P.2d 1032, 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 483 (1973).
82. See, e.g., Harris v. Standard Acc. & Ins. Co., 191 F.Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
83. Id. at 540.
84. Id
85. Koppie v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973).
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proper conduct of the insurance company is to make prompt pay-
ment.86 Severe or outrageous conduct or consequences need not exist in
order to establish bad faith. One writer believes the requirement of
good faith is a minimal standard rather than a high ideal . 7
The Standard Test
The insurer is held to the standard of a professional when defend-
ing lawsuits against its insured. The question is, "[D]id the insurer exer-
cise that degree of skill, judgment and consideration for the welfare of
the insured which it, as a skilled professional defender of lawsuits hav-
ing sole charge of the investigation, settlement, and trial of the suit may
have been expected to utilize?"8 8 If it did not, the court may regard the
conduct as a breach of the duty owed the insured.
In Communale, the bad faith conduct was the failure to settle third
party claims brought against the insured, thereby exposing the insured
to a judgment in excess of the policy limits. The court declined to fol-
low cases that held there was no liability in excess of the policy limits if
the insurer believed there to be no coverage and refused to defend or
settle the case. The court, disapproving of an insurer who would profit
by their own wrongs, warned that an insurer who denies coverage does
so at his own risk, even if the insurer's position was not entirely
groundless.8 9
A third party claim was also involved in Crisci. There, bad faith
was defined as dishonesty, fraud, concealment, or an unwarranted or
unreasonable refusal to settle the claim.9" The liability may exist when-
ever the insurer refuses to settle in an appropriate case, and whenever
an insurer refuses an offered settlement where the most reasonable
manner of disposing of the claim is by accepting the offer.9' In deter-
mining whether an insurer has given consideration to the interests of
the insured, the test applied in Crisci was whether a prudent insurer
without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer.92 In us-
ing this "prudent insurer" test, the court is measuring bad faith by an
objective standard.
86, 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1716.
87. Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law And The Sales Provisions OfThe Uni-
form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
88. See 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 55, at §4712.
89. 50 Cal. 2d at -, 328 P.2d at 202.
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A similar objective test, applied in California, was premised on the
idea that since an insurance company is quasi-public in nature, it is
held to the standard of service that the public may reasonably expect.93
In a different case, a subjective standard was applied where recovery
required a finding that the insurer had deliberately withheld payment
of the policy and forced an arbitration hearing after it knew the claim
to be completely valid and that the company had no defense.94
The Fletcher decision, as previously mentioned, involved an action
based on the tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The gravamen of this cause of action is the protection of one's peace of
mind from extreme and outrageous conduct. The court also discussed
the alternative rationale of the breach of the good faith duty. In this
regard, Fletcher applied a dual standard:95 First, the court applied the
objective test as to whether a reasonable insurance company would en-
gage in such conduct. Second, the court applied the subjective test as to
whether this insurance company knew or reasonably should have
known that harm may result. The California Supreme Court applied
this same dual standard in Gruenberg. There, conduct toward the in-
sured was classified as malicious and without probable cause.96 The
court based liability on the insurer's unreasonable and bad faith with-
holding of payment.97 The significance of the Gruenberg decision is
that the result was based solely on bad faith conduct, whereas Fletcher
rested on alternative holdings.
Still another test has been used by the courts. A recent California
decision on bad faith 98 appears to rely on a balancing test: an insurer is
obligated to give the interests of the insured at least as much con-
sideration as it gives its own interests. This case did not involve know-
ing, malicious or unreasonable conduct by the insurance company. The
company, instead, was proceeding under an apparently reasonable be-
lief that the policy was not applicable because of possible workmen's
compensation coverage. Although the delay in payment may have had
economic motives, the conduct did not involve malice, but rather a
business judgment that the policy was not applicable in the circum-
93. Barrera v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1969).
94. Richardson v. Employers Liab. Ass. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1972).
95. 10 Cal. App. 3d at -, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
96. 9 Cal. 3d at -, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (1973).
97. Id.
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stances. The court weighed the interests and concluded that the insurer
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by its failure to
make the payments during pendency of the insured's claim for work-
men's compensation benefits.99 The number of independent theories of
recovery and the variety of standards for determining bad faith, may
reflect a California trend toward an application of strict liability in
cases of insurer breaches with attendant emotional distress. 1°°
In Oklahoma, a subjective standard was applied in Christian. The
plaintiff alleged that the insurance company willfully and in bad faith
withheld payment of the claim, knowing that the insured was perma-
nently disabled.'' The court accepted this test while noting that an
available defense would be an insurer's reasonable belief that the claim
was factually or legally insufficient.10 2
Any attempt to list all the factors which might constitute bad
faith would unnecessarily limit the usefulness of such a flexible
concept to the courts. It is a feeling mainly of unjust treatment that
the courts use as a mechanism to provide a remedy for an aggrieved
plaintiff. Regarding the insurance industry, case law suggests various
indicia including:
[T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of
liability and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the
insured to contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the
evidence against the insured; the insurer's rejection of advice
of its own attorney or agent; failure of the insurer to inform
the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial
risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to
settle; the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejec-
tion of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts;
and any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith
on the part of the insurer.10
3
Another helpful guideline is provided by the Model Unfair Claims
Practice Act, which enumerates several additional indicia of bad
faith. 1 4
99. Id. at--, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
100. For a discussion of the application of strict liability as it relates to insurance company's
bad faith breach, see Note, Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company.- A Trend Toward
Strict Liabilityfor Emotional Distress in the Insurance Industry, 12 CAL. W. L. REV. 591 (1976).
101. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1714.
102. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1716. See also note 35 supra.
103. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, -, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957).
104. The Unfair Claims Practices Act has been enacted by Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §746.230
(1975); and California, CAL. INS. CODE §790.03 (West Supp. 1978). Oregon's version provides:
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Damages
The allegation of damages proximately caused by the defendant's
conduct is the fourth element of bad faith breach. An insurer's tortious
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings may result in an
insured's recovery of attorney fees, litigation costs, compensatory and
punitive damages, including damages for mental suffering.'05 Two of
(1) No insurer or other person shall commit or perform any of the following
unfair claim settlement practices:
(a) Misrepresenting facts or policy provisions in settling claims;
(b) Failing to acknowledge and act promptly upon communications relat-
ing to claims;
(c) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation of claims;
(d) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation
based on all available information;
(e) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
after completed proof of loss statements have been submitted;
(f) Not attempting, in good faith, to promptly and equitably settle claims in
which liability has become reasonably clear,
(g) Compelling claimants to initiate litigation to recover amounts due by
offering substantially less than amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought
by such claimants;
(h) Attempting to settle claims for less than the amount to which a reason-
able man would believe he was entitled after referring to written or printed adver-
tising material accompanying or made part of an application;
(i) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application altered without
notice to or consent of the applicant;
(j) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries,
upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made;
(k) Delaying investigation or payment of claims by requiring a claimant or
his physician to submit a preliminary claim report and then requiring subsequent
submission of loss forms when both require essentially the same in formation;
(1) Failing to promptly settle claims under one coverage of a policy whereliability has become reasonably clear in order to influence settlements under other
coverages of the policy; or
n(in) Failing to inomtly roithe proper explanation of the basis relied
on in the insurance policy i relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a
claim.
(2) No insurer shall refuse, without just cause, to pay or settle claims arising
under coverages provided by its policies with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice in this state, which general business practice is evidenced by:
(a) A substantial increase in the number of complaints against the insurer
received by the Insurance Division;
(b) A substantial increase in the number of lawsuits filed against the insurer
or its insureds by claimants; or
(c) Other relevant evidence.
OR. REv. STAT. §746.230 (1975).
California's version of the act is identical to the Oregon statute set out above except that
California excludes the provisions numbered as, (2) (a)-(c). Additionally, California has added a
provision to part (1) of the Oregon enactment set out above that includes in the definition of
unfair practices: "Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to
accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration."
105. See Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 1714, 1715 (July 12,
1977). In Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973), the
insured was allowed to recover his cost of litigation on appeal from three insurance companies
involved in bad faith conduct. In Kirk v. Safeco Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970),
attorney fees were awarded where the bad faith conduct amounted to a wilful, wanton and mali-
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the more significant of these categories are discussed below.
Mental Suffering
In a judgment establishing tortious interference with the insured's
protected property interest, damages may be recovered to compensate
for all the detriment proximately resulting, including emotional dis-
tress. 0 6 Damages may be awarded for mental suffering without a
showing that the insured suffered severe or aggravated emotional dis-
tress, as is necessary in the independent tort of intentional inffiction of
mental suffering.0 7 The plaintiff need show only an aggravation of his
money or contract damages. In California, an action for mental suffer-
ing arises after a showing of an aggravation of damages, as loss of earn-
ings, foreclosure of business, mounting credit liabilities, litigation costs
or medical expenses, and the mental anguish which results. l08 In re-
viewing the remedies allowed by the courts, careful attention is neces-
sary in order to distinguish between the recovery for mental distress as
a result of bad faith conduct and the independent tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 0 9 Either, or both, may be an available
action.
Punitive Damages
The California Supreme Court has stated that the insurer's mere
breach of duty is not sufficient to subject it to liability for punitive dam-
ages.1 0 The insurer must exhibit oppressive or malicious conduct or a
conscious disregard of the insured's rights to be found so liable. Malice,
however, as well as malicious intent, may be inferred from the circum-
stances. "'
cious tort. See also Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1972) (award of face
amount of life insurance policy and attorney fees). Judgments have been awarded in excess of
policy limits. See Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F.Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla.
1976); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). Consequential
damages have been allowed where bad faith actions resulted in loss of business and credit. See
Campbell v. Gov. Empl. Ins. Co., 306 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1975); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1975).
106. See notes 1-4 & 20-31 supra and accompanying text.
107. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, -n.10, 510 P.2d 1032, 1042 n.10, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 490 n.10 (1973).
108. Id. at -, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
109. Compare Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1972) (recovery based on
the tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress) witO Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9
Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973) (recovery of damages for mental distress
under the independent theory of tortious breach).
110. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal.3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711
(1974).
111. See Walton v. Anderson, 6 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 86 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970).
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Likewise, the Oklahoma court in Christian endorsed the Califor-
nia approach and stated that "damages may be recovered to compen-
sate for all detriment proximately resulting therefrom, including
economic loss as well as emotional distress resulting from the conduct
or from the economic losses caused by the conduct, and, in a proper
case, punitive damages." 2 Florida courts have also warned that insur-
ance companies are vulnerable to punitive damages when they deal
with their insureds unethically.113 The cases are evolving and the courts
are in apparent agreement that where the suit rests upon a tortious
breach by the insurer of its obligation to deal fairly and in good faith
with its own insured, the fact that the conduct also constitutes a breach
of contract does not prevent the recovery of punitive damages.' 14
V. OTHER AREAS "BAD FAITH BREACH" MAY APPLY
Once a contract is formed between two parties in a special
relationsho, the requisite premise for the application of the theory of
bad faith breach exists. If the party in the position of power exercises
bad faith from which damage ensues, the other party has a remedy in
this new area of tort liability. Heretofore, the essence of the special re-
lationship has been the strong state interest in the contract involving
services of a quasi-public nature.
A logical expansion of this new tort theory would extend it to
other businesses which are governmentally regulated to a substantial
degree. A review of Oklahoma statutes suggests some additional busi-
nesses within this category, including: state banks and savings and loan
associations, '15investment companies, ' 16 credit unions, 17 trust compa-
nies, " 8 insurance companies, including surety and bond companies,"19
and common carriers. 120 It is obvious that this new tort could have tre-
mendous impact on the whole of contractual relationships.
112. 48 OKLA. B.A.J. at 1715.
113. Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F.Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
114. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. See Christian v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 48
OKLA. B.A.J. 1714 (July 12, 1977); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d
919 (1970).
115. Banking: OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§101-1415 (1971); Savings & Loans: OKLA. STAT. tit, 18,
§§211-381 (1971).
116. Investment Companies and Securities: OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§8-101-8-406 (1971).
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§2001-2022 (1971).
118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§101-1415 (1971).
119. Insurance: OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§101-5001 (1971); Surety Companies: OKLA. STAT, tit.
18, §§481-491 (1971).
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§1-201 (1971).
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VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
"It is time to recognize that the courts have created a new tort."'
12
'
This observation by Dean Prosser in 1939, in reference to the tort of
intentional infliction of mental suffering, is equally applicable today to
the tort of "bad faith breach." Legal writers have used varying labels
when reviewing the development of this new tort. One writer, obviously
displeased with the courts' attempt to afford more protection to in-
sureds, referred to it as the tort of the "Insurer's Mistaken Judg-
ment."' 22 Others, attempting to describe the purpose of the tort, have
referred to it as the "New Tort of Outrage,123 "Gruenber-ian
Tort,"124 "Tort of Bad Faith,"' 25 "Tortious Breach of Contract,"' 26 and
"Tortious Interference with a Protected Property Interest."' 127 This
writer favors the term "Bad Faith Breach" as the appropriate label,
even while recognizing that Dean Prosser has said that there is no need
for a tort to have a name. 128 As another writer in the tort field has
expressed,
Most torts have names but there is no necessity that they do
so. There are a number of tort actions (and the number is
increasing) which are recognized by the courts but, lacking a
modem Adam before whom these animals can be paraded to
be named, the courts and legal writers have not agreed upon a
common name for these actions. As with those torts which
have been recognized for a much longer time, these more re-
cent tort actions eventually will have common names. In the
meanwhile, a rose by any other name...129
It is apparent that after a nineteen-year gestation period, from
Communale to Christian, a new tort has been born. The tort of bad
faith breach is here to stay. As one insurance writer stated, it is in full
bloom and forced upon the insurance industry "like a flower in a hot-
121. W. PROSSER, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: .A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV.
874 (1939).
122. Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment-4 New Tort, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 775 (1976).
123. Volz, The New Tort of Outrage, 36 ALA. LAW. 568 (1975).
124. See Comment, An Independent Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Con-
tracts-Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 492, 503 (1974).
125. Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" Is In FullBloom, 9 F. 63, 71 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Insurers Beware].
126. Richardson v. Employees Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, -, 102 Cal. Rptr.
547, 552 (1972).
127. Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer And The Tort of the International fsic] Infliction of
Mental Distress. Fletcher v. Western National Lfe Insurance Co., 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 355, 339
(1972).
128. PROSSER note 67 supra at 3.
129. J. HAGER, CASES ON TORTS 2 (2d ed. 1972).
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house."' 130 The fate of this new blossom, in name and effect, lies ulti-
mately in the hands of the American courts of law.
Tictoria A. Myers
130. Insurers Beware, supra note 125, at 71.
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